Every file in a Vaultern vault is encrypted on your iPhone with AES-256-GCM, under its own random key. The key that opens a vault comes from your pattern together with a secret sealed by your iPhone's Secure Enclave, so a copy of the vault can't be cracked on another computer. Backups reach your iCloud already encrypted. There is no account and no Vaultern server, so we hold nothing.
Who can see what
The numbers point to the sources at the end of the page.
| Us | Nothing. There is no account, no analytics and no Vaultern server, so there is nothing of yours at our end to read or to hand over. |
|---|---|
| Whoever holds your unlocked phone | Apple says the Hidden album is locked by default and opens with Face ID, Touch ID or the passcode.1 Whoever can get past the phone's own lock can open it. A Vaultern vault opens only for its own pattern or PIN, never for the iPhone passcode, and the app shows no list of vaults and no count. |
| Whoever copies the app's files | Encrypted data only. They can't guess your pattern on their own computer, because the key also needs a secret that never leaves your phone. |
| Whoever holds your locked phone | Apple says that for iOS 8 and later it cannot extract data from a passcode-locked iPhone, because the data is encrypted and Apple does not hold the key.3 That is Apple. Other forensic tools exist, and we make no promise about what they can do to a particular phone. |
| Apple, on a default iCloud setup | Apple says that under its default setting it holds the keys to iCloud Photos and can decrypt them.2 Its guidelines for United States law enforcement say iCloud content, including stored photos and device backups, may be provided in response to a search warrant.3 A Vaultern backup is different: it is encrypted on your phone before it leaves, and Apple stores it without being able to open it. |
| Whoever you share a vault with | Only the vault you shared, for as long as you allow. You set how many times it opens and when it expires, and you can block export. |
How the encryption works, step by step
Every vault opens through a chain of keys. Your pattern is only the first link, and on its own it opens nothing.
- Your pattern becomes a key, slowly. Argon2id turns the dots you draw into a pattern key, using 64 MiB of memory and about 0.7 seconds on your phone.
- The phone adds its own secret. HKDF-SHA-256 joins the pattern key with the device secret: 256 random bits, sealed by the Secure Enclave. Together they make the unlock key.
- The unlock key finds one vault. It works out the name of a single object in the app's storage. If that object exists and opens, its vault opens. There's no list of vaults to search.
- The master key opens the files. Each vault has a random 256-bit master key, stored only in locked form: once under the unlock key, once under the recovery key that comes from your 12-word phrase. It opens each file's own key, and each file is encrypted with AES-256-GCM.
- Backups need the phrase, never the pattern. The device secret stays on the phone, so your iCloud backup opens only with the recovery phrase.
The cryptographic stack
| Part | What Vaultern uses | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| File encryption | AES-256-GCM, in 1 MiB segments, in the published streaming format of Google's Tink library9 | Encrypts each file under its own random 256-bit key. Any change to the encrypted file makes it refuse to open. |
| From pattern to key | Argon2id6, with 64 MiB of memory, tuned on each phone to about 0.7 seconds per try | Turns your pattern or PIN into a key, slowly on purpose, so every guess costs time and memory. |
| Device secret | A random 256-bit secret, sealed to a Secure Enclave key8 | Never leaves the phone and is never in a backup, so a copied vault can't be guessed open anywhere else. |
| Combining keys | HKDF-SHA-2567 | Joins your pattern key and the device secret, with a separate label for every purpose. |
| Recovery | 12 random words from the BIP-39 list10 (128 bits) | Opens the vault, and its backup, on a new or restored phone. |
| Shared vaults | A random key for each shared vault, locked under a key derived with Argon2id from its six-word share phrase | The share phrase opens that one vault and nothing else. |
| Libraries | Apple's CryptoKit, and libsodium for Argon2id | No home-made primitives. The streaming layer follows Tink's published format and is tested against its test vectors. |
AES-256-GCM: every file, its own key
AES is the encryption standard published by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology4, and 256 is the length of the key in bits. GCM is the mode that also proves nothing was changed5: if anyone alters, cuts or reorders the encrypted file, it fails to open instead of opening wrong.
Vaultern encrypts files in 1 MiB segments, each with its own check. That is why a long video plays and skips forward without the whole file being decrypted first. Every file gets a new random key, and editing a file writes a new file with a new key.
Argon2id: why slow is good
A pattern has far fewer possibilities than a long password, so the defence is the cost of each guess. Argon2id needs 64 MiB of memory and about 0.7 seconds for every try, which makes guessing slow and expensive by design.
Because the key also needs the phone's own secret, a copy of your vault can't be guessed on a fast computer somewhere else. Guessing goes through your phone, where every wrong pattern makes the next try wait longer, and the count survives a restart. Slips spread across a day never add up: each hour forgives one wrong try. Nothing is ever erased because of wrong guesses. How long guessing takes, and what could make it faster, is set out below.
A secret that never leaves the phone
When you install Vaultern, it makes a random secret and seals it to a key inside your iPhone's Secure Enclave, the chip Apple built to keep keys out of reach of the rest of the phone8. That secret never leaves the device and is never in any backup.
The result: someone who copies your vault from a backup, from iCloud or from the phone's storage holds encrypted data they can't attack offline. It also means that on a new phone, each vault needs its recovery phrase once.
How long would it take to guess a pattern?
The answer turns on what the guesser has. Three cases, from the most likely to the worst:
A copy of your data: they can't even start
Files copied off your phone are useless without the device secret, and that never leaves it. Your iCloud backup opens only with your 12-word recovery phrase, which has about 3.4 × 10³⁸ possible combinations. A billion graphics cards, each trying ten billion phrases a second, would need about 80 times the age of the universe to try them all.
Your phone, guessing in the app: thousands of years
Every wrong pattern makes the next try wait longer, until it's about one guess an hour, and the waits survive a restart. At that pace, this is how long it takes to try every combination:
| Your lock | Possible combinations | Guessing in the app |
|---|---|---|
| Six-digit PIN | 1,000,000 | 110 years |
| 6-dot pattern | 19,174,112 | 2,200 years |
| 7-dot pattern | 261,248,096 | 30,000 years |
| 8-dot pattern | 3,428,210,784 | 390,000 years |
| 10-dot pattern | 521,228,609,960 | 59 million years |
| 12-dot pattern | 65,535,547,847,624 | 7.5 billion years |
On average a guesser finds a pattern halfway through, and sooner if it's a common shape. We counted the patterns exactly, from the app's own drawing rules. Every extra dot multiplies the work by about 13. A six-digit PIN is the weakest lock here.
The worst case: your phone, its passcode and a forensic exploit
The app's waits are kept by the app, not by the phone's hardware. Someone with your phone, its passcode and a working exploit for your version of iOS could get around them and guess as fast as Argon2id allows, or copy the device secret out and guess on their own computers.
Argon2id still makes every guess slow and memory-hungry, but against a well-equipped lab no pattern a person can remember holds for ever. Length is what buys time. If that's your risk, use at least 10 dots, ideally 12, with several changes of direction and no letters or simple shapes, and keep iOS up to date, so known exploits stop working.
Zero-knowledge, with nothing to know
Zero-knowledge means the company behind an app never holds the keys to what you store. Vaultern goes further: there is no account, no email, no analytics and no Vaultern server. Backup, sync and sharing travel through your own iCloud, already encrypted. There is nothing about you at our end to sell, leak or hand over.
Hidden vaults, on the screen and on disk
A different pattern opens a different vault, and nothing lists them: not the app, and not the data on disk, not even in encrypted form. All files sit in one pool with random names, and nothing in a name, header or location says which vault a file belongs to. Backups are padded and carry nothing that says which vault they belong to.
The total storage the app uses is visible, like any app's. So the claim is exact: nothing in Vaultern shows how many vaults there are or which file belongs to which.
Locking and memory
- Leave the app, and it locks. The keys are discarded, the key buffers cleared, and the app switcher shows a cover instead of your vault.
- Lay it face down, and it locks. On by default. A quick tilt doesn't lock, and neither does holding the phone face down above you. The motion sensors are read only while a vault is open and the app is in front, and no permission is needed.
- Kept out of the rest of the phone. Vault content stays out of Spotlight, Handoff, the clipboard and system previews, and the app writes no logs with keys, patterns, phrases, file names or content.
- Face ID is a gate, not a key. The Secure Enclave checks your face before you draw the pattern. A changed face, a broken sensor or an update can never lock you out of your data.
- The iPhone passcode is never a way in. Only a vault's own pattern or PIN opens it.
- Text is read on the phone. Search reads the words in photos, scans and PDFs with Apple's Vision framework, on the device, with no server. The text is kept encrypted inside the vault and never logged.
Break-in alerts
Off until you turn them on. Then the second wrong try in a row on the unlock screen makes the front camera take one photo, with no shutter sound, while iOS shows its camera indicator. The photo is stripped of metadata and sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key from the phone's device secret. It never leaves that phone: no sync, no iCloud, no backup. The next time any vault opens, it shows when it happened and how many wrong tries there were, never which vault was tried, so you can save the photo into the open vault or delete it.
The limits: it can't photograph someone who copies the app's files instead of guessing on the phone, and anyone who opens a vault on that phone sees the alerts, even with the decoy pattern. More on the break-in alerts page.
What Apple can see in iCloud
Your backup, sync and shared vaults live in your own iCloud, encrypted before they leave the phone. Apple can see that encrypted data exists, how big it is and when it changes. For a shared vault, Apple also sees who shares with whom, because sharing runs through iCloud accounts. Apple cannot see what is inside.
If you are made to unlock it
No app can stop someone who forces you to give up a pattern. That is what two features are for. A decoy vault opens for a second pattern and shows only what you chose to put there. The Emergency pattern, part of Pro, opens one vault and removes every other vault from the phone. Your iCloud backups stay, encrypted, so you can restore later with your recovery phrases.
What Vaultern does not protect against
We say these plainly, because overpromising puts people at risk.
- Malware or a jailbroken phone while a vault is open. Software that watches the screen sees what you see.
- Someone with your phone, your passcode and unlimited time. They can keep guessing patterns on the phone as fast as Argon2id allows, and with a forensic exploit they could copy the device secret out and guess on their own computers. The app's delays slow a casual guesser; the phone's hardware doesn't count attempts for us. Against them, a longer pattern is what buys time.
- Proof that no other vault exists. Storage use is visible. The app never shows a list or a count.
- What Apple can observe: sizes and timing, and for shared vaults, who shares with whom.
- A person you shared a vault with keeping what they saw, or photographing the screen.
- Losing both the pattern and the recovery phrase. That vault is gone, by design. Nobody can open it, us included.
- Copies outside the vault: a photo still in your camera roll or iCloud library, or one you already sent.
- A pattern someone watched you draw. Draw it where nobody can see.
Check it yourself
The free tools on this site never upload your photo. Open your browser's network panel while you use one and watch: no file leaves the page.
Questions
Can Vaultern see my photos?
No. Your vault is encrypted on your iPhone, and nothing that could open it is ever sent to us. There is no account and no server for it to go to.
Can Apple open my Vaultern backup?
No. It is encrypted on your phone first and tied to your recovery phrase, which Apple never has. Apple can see its size and when it changes.
Is a pattern weaker than a password?
Yes: a pattern has fewer possibilities than a long password. That's why Vaultern pairs it with a secret that never leaves the phone and with deliberately slow key derivation. Length is what counts: every extra dot multiplies the work of guessing by about 13, as the guessing table shows. A pattern must use at least six dots; more is better.
Can a court order make you hand over my photos?
A court order served on us finds nothing, because we never have your files or your keys. What Apple holds is described in the table above.
What happens if I forget my pattern?
Use the vault's recovery phrase to open it and set a new pattern. If you lose both, that vault can't be opened by anyone.
Sources and references
- Apple Support, Hide photos on your iPhone, iPad, Mac, or Apple Vision Pro with the Hidden album; and Apple's iPhone User Guide, Delete or hide photos and videos on iPhone.
- Apple Support, iCloud data security overview.
- Apple, Legal Process Guidelines: Government and Law Enforcement within the United States, published October 2025.
- NIST, FIPS 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
- NIST, SP 800-38D: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM).
- IETF, RFC 9106: Argon2 Memory-Hard Function.
- IETF, RFC 5869: HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF).
- Apple Platform Security, The Secure Enclave.
- Google Tink, Streaming AEAD.
- Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 39, Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys (the word list).